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For over a century, social theorists have attempted to explain why 
those who lack economic power consent to hierarchies of social 
and political power. They have used ideology, hegemony and 
discourse as key concepts to explain the intersections between 
the social production of knowledge and the perpetuation of power 
relations. The Marxist concept of ideology describes how the 
dominant ideas within a given society reflect the interests of a rul-
ing economic class. In this paper, I trace the movement from this 
concept of ideology to models of hegemony and discourse. I then 
trace a second set of ruptures in theories of ideology, hegemony 
and discourse. Marx and others link ideology to a vision of society 
dominated by economic class as a field of social power. However, 
theorists of gender and “race” have questioned the place of class 
as the locus of power. I conclude by arguing that key theorists of 
gender and “race”— Hall, Smith, hooks and Haraway — offer 
a more complex understanding of how our consent to networks 
of power is produced within contemporary capitalist societies. 
This argument has important implications for theory and practice 
directed at destabilizing our consent to power.
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Introduction
 For over a century, social theorists have attempted to explain 
why those who lack economic power consent to hierarchies of 
social power that privilege some while exploiting others. Theories 
of ideology, hegemony and discourse have been used to explain 
the intersections between the social production of knowledge 
and the perpetuation of inequitable power relations. These bod-
ies of theory attempt to link an understanding of social privilege 
and injustice with an account of the production and circulation 
of culture and knowledge. Here, the social production and dis-
semination of knowledge secures our consent to systematic social 
inequity.
 The key concept of ideology is the starting point for this theo-
retical overview. Marxist theory uses the notion of ideology to de-
scribe the process through which the dominant ideas within a given 
society reflect the interests of a ruling economic class. However, 
ideology has proven a problematic notion, as many of its propo-
nents have treated it as a relatively stable body of knowledge that 
the ruling class transmits wholesale to its subordinate classes.
 In his article, “Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies,” 
Stuart Hall (1992) reviews several moments of theoretical “inter-
ruption” in cultural theories of ideology (p. 282). These include the 
discourse theories of post-structuralism and postmodernism, on one 
hand; and the impact of feminist and critical “race” scholarship, on 
the other.1 The interruption of post-structuralism is important for 
foregrounding the salience of language as a medium of social power. 
By contrast, feminist theory contributes a notion of the personal 
dimensions of political power and emphasizes questions about 
gender. Similarly, critical “race” theory focuses on racialized pat-
terns of power and destabilizes the class subject of ideology theory. 
1 Throughout this paper, I use the word “race” in quotation marks to emphasize 
the social construction of race through discourses of racialization. The quota-
tion marks assert distance from a notion of race as a reified, biological social 
category. That is, “race” refers to the products of racializing discourse that 
may be taken up by individual and collective actors at specific social-historical 
locations. I retain the term “race” to acknowledge the continuing salience of the 
term in public discourse.
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I will take Hall’s brief discussion of these theoretical interruptions 
as an inspiration and point of departure for the present paper.
 Less a point of rupture than a radical reinterpretation of Marxist 
ideology theory, Antonio Gramsci uses the concept of hegemony 
to illustrate how the state and civil society produce and maintain 
consent to the class hierarchies of capitalist society (Hall 1992; Hall 
1996b). Whereas ideology connotes closure and a unidirectional 
flow of power, hegemony emphasizes the inherent conflict involved 
in constructing networks of power through knowledge. With the 
concept of discourse, post-structuralism and post-Marxism further 
challenge the notion of ideology. Discourse theory argues against the 
economism of ideology theory and undermines the privileged stand-
point of the working class as a historical actor. Here, social power 
is diffused among a gigantic web that lacks a definite center.
 In this paper, I trace the movement from ideology to hege-
mony and discourse. Through a selective review of key theorists, 
I illuminate the points of tension and continuity between these 
perspectives. However, these approaches are not mutually contra-
dictory options for understanding social power. Rather, we might 
usefully locate them along a continuum. This continuum allows 
us to visualize the ongoing tension between critical theory’s atten-
tion to political praxis, oppression and domination, on one hand; 
and post-structuralism’s attention to complexity, fragmentation 
and the microstructures of power, on the other. While theories of 
discourse emerge prior to ideology theory, in a temporal sense, 
the continuum allows us to visualize the continuity between these 
concepts. In other words, theories of discourse rarely act as a total 
negation of the notion of ideology. Instead, discourse, hegemony 
and ideology are intertwined with each other. For example, while 
Purvis and Hunt (1993) argue that while we can analytically sepa-
rate discourse and ideology, we should also understand ideology 
as an effect of discourse. In essence, where discourse is mobilized 
to reinforce systems of social power it functions as ideology. For 
these authors, discourse is not necessarily ideological; however, 
ideology is discursive.
 Insofar as I am interested in the points of tension and continuity 
between Marxist critical theory and post-structuralist theories of 
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discourse, this theoretical overview fits into other work that address 
the ways that critical theory might engage with post-structuralism 
(Agger 1998; Best and Kellner 1991; Eagleton 1991). While I fo-
cus on how these bodies of theory conceptualize the relationship 
between the cultural production of knowledge and the reproduction 
of social power, I also wish to broaden the scope of discussion be-
yond offering ideas about a rapprochement between critical theory 
and post-structuralism. Thus, I will trace a second set of ruptures 
in theories of ideology, hegemony and discourse. Marx and others 
link their concept of ideology to a vision of society dominated by 
economic class as a field of social power. However, critical theories 
of gender and “race” have disrupted the Marxist model of ideology. 
By bringing attention to the production of gendered and racialized 
networks of social power, these bodies of work have decentered 
class as the locus of power.
 Finally, I offer Figure 1 as a theoretical map, which overlays 
these two theoretical movements and which illustrates the scope of 
this theoretical overview. First, there is a movement from ideology 
towards discourse. Second, there is expansion away from class as 
the most salient political subject position, towards a greater focus 
on gender and racialization as important mechanisms of structuring 
social life (see Figure 1). I will proceed to trace a route through this 
theoretical map as follows. First, I will examine critical theories of 
ideology, beginning with Marx and ending with Gramsci. Second, 
I will review post-structuralist and post-Marxist approaches to 
discourse. These bodies of work constitute important moments of 
rupture in theories of ideology.
 The following two sections of the paper will examine critical 
theories of gender and “race,” which represent two further points of 
rupture. Here, the main impact is the decentering of class as the cen-
tral dimension of social power and political action. I will conclude 
by arguing that theorists working in these latter areas—including 
Dorothy Smith, Stuart Hall, bell hooks and Donna Haraway—offer 
the most complex and promising understanding of how consent to 
social power is produced. This argument has important implications 
for theory and practice directed at destabilizing our consent to power, 
which I will draw out in the concluding section of the paper.
195
Ideology, Hegemony, Discourse
Critical Theories of Ideology
An Origin Story: Marx’s Notion of Ideology
 The notion of ideology, as it informed critical social theory 
throughout the twentieth century, emerged in the work of Karl Marx 
(1977; also see Marx and Engels 1989). Here, ideology refers to the 
ways in which society as a whole adopts the ideas and interests of 
the dominant economic class. Marx’s model of ideology rests upon 
a historical-materialist perspective, which asserts that material real-
ity is the foundation of social consciousness. Material reality sets 
boundaries on the ideas that may emerge as important, or even accept-
able, in a given social setting. However, it is through the dominant 
ideologies of capitalism that the working classes take for granted 
their exploitation within economic structures of inequality.
 For Marx, the most important aspects of material reality centre 
on human productive labor. The appropriation of resources from the 
natural world for the production of goods is the foundation of social 
life. Within a capitalist mode of production, the most important 
social relations are those between members of the working class 
as they engage in productive labor, as well as the relations between 
the working class and the capitalist class, which owns the means of 
production (such as factories and machines). Through their owner-
 
Figure 1: Mapping Theories of Ideology and Discourse 
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ship of the means of production, the capitalist class gains the power 
to appropriate the labor of the working classes, who lack access to 
the means to produce the necessities of survival — including food, 
clothing, shelter — for themselves.
 Ideology enters Marx’s theoretical framework to explain how 
the subordinate classes take exploitative relations of production 
for granted, as something solid and unchangeable. One way in 
which this is accomplished is the way in which objects with use 
value become commodities characterized by their exchange value. 
Objects produced through human labor have value insofar as they 
fulfill a particular function. The use value of wood may be real-
ized if I build a house; the use value of an apple is realized when I 
eat it. By contrast, exchange value refers to the social labor that is 
required to produce the same objects for a capitalist economy.
 The move from use value towards a system of exchange value 
removes from visibility the role of human labor in producing 
value. Commodity “fetishism” refers to the way in which the ob-
jects produced by human labor are divorced from that productive 
labor and are re-located in the economy of exchange value within 
a capitalist mode of production (Marx 1977:165). This process is 
ideological in the sense that it obscures the central importance of 
labor to social life. It transforms the material product of human 
labor into a “social hieroglyphic” which is undecipherable to 
capital’s subordinate classes (p. 167). Through this process, elite 
social groups naturalize capitalist relations of production. Workers 
come to view the capitalist mode of production as the only viable 
option, where they must sell their labor power to the capitalist class 
in order to obtain commodities. Ideology, then, functions to secure 
the participation of subordinate classes in exploitative relations of 
production.
 For Marx, the equation of labor power with money, or wages, 
is another way in which ruling groups secure the consent of the 
working classes for their own exploitation. Workers exchange their 
labor power for wages, which they use to purchase the commodi-
ties that they produce, but which the capitalist class owns and sells. 




What flows back to the worker in the shape of wages is a portion 
of the product he himself continuously reproduces. . . . The illu-
sion created by the money form vanishes immediately if, instead 
of taking a single capitalist and a single worker, we take the whole 
capitalist class and the whole working class. The capitalist class 
is constantly giving to the working class drafts, in the form of 
money, on a portion of the product produced by the latter and 
appropriated by the former. The workers give these drafts back 
just as constantly to the capitalists … The transaction is veiled 
by the commodity-form of the product and the money-form of 
the commodity (Marx 1977:712-713).
Marx’s use of terms like “illusion” and “veiled” suggests that both 
the commodity form and money play an ideological role in securing 
the willing participation of the working classes in their own domi-
nation. Wages construct an illusion for the working class that veils 
the exploitative relation of the appropriation of surplus value.
 In Marx’s writing, resistance to ideology must take a primarily 
material form. It is not sufficient to analyze ideological systems 
from a theoretical or academic standpoint. He writes, “All forms 
and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criti-
cism . . . but only by the practical overthrow of the actual social 
relations which gave rise to the idealistic humbug” (Marx and 
Engels 1989:258). Political praxis must involve people acting for 
social change within the mode of production. Just as material real-
ity gives rise to the dominant ideologies of a society, people can 
only overcome the ideology of capitalism through action directed 
at transforming the economic substructure of society.
The Frankfurt School and Ideology
The Frankfurt School theorists, including Walter Benjamin, 
Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, took up 
Marx’s concept of ideology, expanded upon it and gave it greater 
depth. One of the central problematics in this body of work is the 
failure of the proletariat to transform the capitalist mode of produc-
tion through revolutionary action, as predicted by earlier Marxists. 
As an explanation for the acquiescence of the proletariat, these 
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theorists revisited the ideological superstructure as a primary site 
for securing the consent of the dominated classes to capitalist rela-
tions of production. Throughout the twentieth century, culture has 
become increasingly available to the working classes. As Walter 
Benjamin (1968 [1936]) notes, technological change has allowed 
the “mechanical reproduction” and mass dissemination of culture 
(p. 218). Cultural products, such as movies, music, radio broadcasts 
and books, now permeate the everyday lives of a greater proportion 
of the population.
 However, this diffusion of culture throughout society represents 
a superficial democratization that is misleading. Horkheimer and 
Adorno (2002) describe a “culture industry” that is an ensemble 
of media forms (film, newspapers, radio) that transmits ideological 
representations of the world to the masses (p. 95). Echoing Marx, 
contemporary culture does ideological work by representing 
the capitalist mode of production as the only possible world, as 
something unchangeable. This ideological system depicts people 
as essentially the same, regardless of class position. In a similar 
vein, people come to perceive class mobility as a matter of luck. 
As such, there is no point in organizing to resist unequal rela-
tions of power. The culture industry is also a homogenizing force 
that renders people more alike, while promoting a false sense of 
individuality. Thus, people may feel unique through their distinct 
cultural tastes. However, the similar underlying ideological content 
of the culture industry, which incorporates everyone as consumers, 
is much more important than the superficial differences between 
cultural products.
 Herbert Marcuse (1991 [1964]) offers a similar critique of the 
ideological dimensions of modern cultural production. In the “one-
dimensional” society of the twentieth century, capital incorporates 
the working classes into an ever-increasing standard of living. The 
expansion of scientific and technological rationality allows an 
ever-increasing number of people to overcome material scarcity. 
Through this process, elites secure the consent of subordinate groups 
to their unequal participation in capitalist relations of production. 
Where people can more easily meet their “true needs,” their atten-
tion turns to the “false needs” that the capitalist classes construct 
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(Marcuse 1991 [1964]:4). That is, where the working class is able 
to lead a relatively comfortable existence, it loses its revolutionary 
potential (p. 16). Instead, members of the working class willingly 
sell their labor in order to participate in a consumer society filled 
with unnecessary spectacle and widgets.
 Marcuse further describes how the democratization of culture 
is one of the means by which the oppositional standpoint of the 
working class is submerged within taken-for-granted capitalist 
relations of production (p. 56). He writes:
Domination has its own aesthetics, and democratic domination 
has its democratic aesthetics. It is good that almost everyone 
can now have the fine arts at his [sic] fingertips, by just turning 
a knob on his set, or by just stepping into his drugstore. In this 
diffusion, however, they become cogs in a culture-machine which 
remakes their content (p. 65).
Again, we see the notion that a democratized mass culture effec-
tively dissolves critical consciousness. For Marcuse, the result of 
this is the waning importance of Marx’s working class as a his-
torical actor. If there is to be a revolutionary rejection of capitalist 
relations of production, those who have not been integrated into 
the one-dimensional society offer the only real hope for such an 
“absolute refusal” (p. 255).
 Mass culture is not the sole factor that explains why people ac-
cept capitalist social relations as inevitable. Horkheimer and Adorno 
(2002) argue that the increasing reach of scientific and technologi-
cal rationality similarly makes us believe that the structures of the 
existing social world are unchangeable. As science and technology 
make human interactions with nature more predictable and control-
lable, anything that cannot be incorporated into scientific knowledge 
systems appears politically unrealistic. People understand social 
change as a matter of technological progress, not political will. 
The ideological function of scientific and technological rational-
ity is further taken up by Marcuse (1991 [1964]). For him, science 
reduces non-human nature to “potential instrumentality, stuff of 
control and organization” (p. 153). This re-construction of nature 
into something predictable and controllable creates a one-dimen-
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sional lifestyle that the dominated classes become accustomed to 
and are reluctant to give up, even though this means accepting their 
own domination (p. 166). As Marcuse writes, “Nature, scientifically 
comprehended and mastered, reappears in the technical apparatus 
of production and destruction which sustains and improves the life 
of the individuals while subordinating them to the masters of the 
apparatus” (p. 166). Like the world of mass culture, the scientific-
technological world is a world of inevitable social inequality.
 In general, the Frankfurt School theorists emphasize the cultural 
realm and the growth of scientific rationality as important sites of 
domination, where dominant classes exercise power through ideol-
ogy. They provide a useful corrective to Marx’s focus on economic 
production as the primary site of power, oppression and resistance. 
However, these theories tend to attribute a degree of homogeneity 
to the cultural sphere that is debatable. In this work, there is also 
a sense that ideological power flows in a relatively unidirectional 
manner from the capitalist class to mass audiences. There is little 
room here for audience agency, critique or resistance. Here, we get 
the impression of the theorist standing above the masses, seeing what 
the masses cannot because of a totalizing capitalist ideology.
Gramscian Theory and Hegemony
 The concept of ideology, as used by Marx and the Frankfurt 
School theorists is productive insofar as it shows that social power 
operates throughout the cultural realm of society. Ideological sys-
tems work to integrate people into social networks of oppression 
and subordination. However, this model of ideology is limited in 
that it seems too unitary, too totalizing, and too abstracted from 
the everyday social interaction of individual actors. The theoretical 
work of Antonio Gramsci and his successors adds a great deal of 
complexity to the concept of ideology. While Gramsci builds upon 
the Marxist theoretical tradition, his notion of hegemony represents 
an important reinterpretation of the concept of ideology.
 The notion of “hegemony” is rooted in Gramsci’s (1992) dis-
tinction between coercion and consent as alternative mechanisms 
of social power (p. 137). Coercion refers to the State’s capacity for 
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violence, which it can use against those who refuse to participate 
in capitalist relations of production. By contrast, hegemonic power 
works to convince individuals and social classes to subscribe to the 
social values and norms of an inherently exploitative system. It is 
a form of social power that relies on voluntarism and participation, 
rather than the threat of punishment for disobedience. Hegemony 
appears as the “common sense” that guides our everyday, mundane 
understanding of the world. It is a view of the world that is “in-
herited from the past and uncritically absorbed” and which tends 
to reproduce a sort of social homeostasis, or “moral and political 
passivity” (Gramsci 1971:333). Whereas coercive power is the ex-
clusive domain of the State, the institutions of “civil society,” such 
as the Church, schools, the mass media, or the family, are largely 
responsible for producing and disseminating hegemonic power 
(Gramsci 1996:91). In industrial capitalist societies, hegemonic 
power is the prevalent form of social power; the state relies on 
coercion only in exceptional circumstances.
 Like the Frankfurt School theorists, Gramsci ascribes a greater 
degree of importance to the cultural superstructure of capitalist 
societies than is attributed by Marx. From this perspective, the 
superstructure does not simply reflect the economic base. Rather, 
there is a meaningful degree of autonomy between the spheres. This 
means that the ideas of the ruling classes do not necessarily become 
the defining values of society as a whole. Rather, ongoing social 
action creates and reproduces hegemonic power. Hegemonic net-
works of power are the result of contestation between ruling elites 
and “subaltern” groups (p. 21). Because contestation is basic to the 
process of constituting hegemony, there is never a unified, total-
izing system of ideological domination. Hegemony and counter-
hegemony exist in a state of tension; each gives shape to the other. 
For Gramsci one of the main issues facing dominant social groups 
is how to maintain the necessary degree of “ideological unity” to 
secure the consent of the governed (Gramsci 1971:328).
 Gramsci also asserts that hegemony has a material dimension. 
It is not only a system of ideas, floating above economic structures. 
Rather, the social action of everyday life produces hegemonic ef-
fects. Writing about the emergence of Fordist production in the 
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United States, for example, Gramsci (1992) describes an American 
hegemony that is “born in the factory” (p. 169). Gramsci (1996) 
describes how the interplay of our cultural and material surround-
ings constructs hegemony as follows:
The press is the most dynamic part of the ideological structure, 
but not the only one. Everything that directly or indirectly influ-
ences or could influence public opinion belongs to it: libraries, 
schools, associations and clubs of various kinds, even architec-
ture, the layout of streets and their names (p. 53).
Furthermore, hegemony often lies beneath the surface, unarticu-
lated. As Williams (1977) writes, “A lived hegemony is always a 
process. It is not, except analytically, a system or a structure. It is 
a realized complex of experiences, relationships, and activities, 
with specific and changing pressures and limits” (p. 112). This il-
lustrates how hegemony works as a sort of common sense, rather 
than as a coherent body of thought, such as we would associate 
with ideology.
 Gramsci gives us an image of society in which the cultural realm 
is a central location for the exercise of social power. By comparison 
with the Frankfurt School theorists, however, hegemonic power is 
something that is always contested, always historically contingent 
and always unfinished. He ascribes a high level of importance to the 
subaltern classes, intellectuals, and revolutionary political parties 
as agents for social change. For Gramsci, a revolutionary seizure 
of the means of production is not a viable tactic for creating radi-
cal social change in modern capitalist societies. Where a society is 
characterized primarily by the exercise of hegemonic power instead 
of coercion, a prolonged cultural “war of position” is more impor-
tant, where the hegemony of the ruling classes is dissembled and 
a new hegemony is crystallized (Femia 1975: 34). This occurs as 
subaltern groups realize their own capacity to become philosophers 
of their daily experience; they come to understand the hegemonic 
common sense that they otherwise take for granted.
 The Gramscian model of hegemony departs significantly from 
the Marxist notion of ideology, while retaining Marxist foundational 
categories of class, the capitalist mode of production, and the dis-
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tinction between the economic base and the cultural superstructure. 
Among the advances made by Gramscian theory is the attention 
to hegemonic power as an often-implicit “common sense” rather 
than a coherent body of thought, which is inherently unfinished 
and historically contingent. It is the embodiment of hegemony 
in everyday common sense, through the mundane activities con-
nected with work, school, the family and the church, that secures 
the consent of capital’s subaltern classes.
The First Point of Rupture:
Post-Structuralism and Post-Marxism
 While Gramscian theory begins the process of transforming 
the Marxist model of ideology, it remains grounded in a Marxist 
framework where class is the primary force that structures social 
action. Here, I will turn to theorists who make a more decisive break 
from the Marxist framework and posit the concept of discourse as 
an alternative to the Marxist notion of ideology.
Post-structuralism: Foucault
 The concept of “discourse” has a central role in the work of 
Michel Foucault (1978). Discourses are systems of thought, or 
knowledge claims, which assume an existence independent of a 
particular speaker. We constantly draw upon pre-existing discourses 
as resources for social interactions with others. We may think of the 
discourses of academia, which we use to navigate our way through 
school; discourses of medicine, which are employed by doctors and 
patients in medical settings; or the discourses of wilderness that are 
evoked by environmental groups to argue for the preservation of 
parks. Our sense of self—our subjectivity—is constructed through 
our engagement with a multitude of discourses. In Foucault’s work, 
this construction of subject positions shapes our acceptance of rela-
tions of unequal social power.
 Foucault explicitly demarcates discourse from ideology. For 
him, the notion of ideology contains several problems (Foucault 
1980a; Foucault 1980b; Foucault 2000 [1994]b). First, Marxist 
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theory typically sees ideology as something fake, which stands in 
opposition to true knowledge. Foucault describes ideology thus:
In traditional Marxist analyses, ideology is a sort of negative 
element through which the fact is conveyed that the subject’s 
relation to truth, or simply the knowledge relation, is clouded, 
obscured, violated by conditions of existence, social relations, 
or the political forms imposed on the subject of knowledge from 
the outside (Foucault 2000 [1994]b:15).
Instead, Foucault describes how “truth” is produced out of social 
relations and that political relations of power are “the very ground 
on which the subject, the domains of knowledge, and the relations 
with truth are formed” (p. 15). Second, social theorists have often 
treated ideology as an effect of economic structures. By contrast, 
Foucault wants to re-locate the production of “truth” in social rela-
tions, rather than in social structures.
 Third, ideology seems to presuppose individual and collective 
subjects who are lulled into compliance by the false claims of the 
ruling classes. Writing explicitly against Marx, Foucault claims, 
“Labor is absolutely not man’s [sic] concrete essence,” an objective 
reality which is distorted by capitalist ideologies (Foucault 2000 
[1994]b: 86). If we take labor as the thing that defines us as subjects, 
it is only because “a web of microscopic, capillary political power 
had to be established at the level of man’s very existence, attaching 
men to the production apparatus” For Foucault, the creation of the 
laboring subject is not the natural outcome of changes in the mode 
of production. It is something that emerges from social processes; 
it is “synthetic, political; it was a linkage brought about by power” 
(p. 86). While ideology often takes a discursive form, the power 
effects of discourse are more subtle and complex than the model 
that suggested by Marxist theory.
 One of the most important theoretical contributions made by 
Foucault is his re-thinking of the notion of power and his model of 
the relationship between power and knowledge. He views power 
not simply as coercive power, wielded like a weapon by the state 
and by capital. Rather, Foucault (1978; 2003; 2000 [1994]a) of-
fers an alternative conceptualization of power, which has several 
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characteristics. First, power is not only a macrosocial phenomenon. 
Rather, we must understand power as operating throughout a mul-
tiplicity of sites at a local level. Second, power is not only repres-
sive; it is not only a tool of control wielded by one class, or set of 
social institutions, over subordinate classes. Rather, power flows in 
multiple directions. Wherever mechanisms of power are mobilized, 
there are also opportunities for resistance. Third, notions of a “Great 
Refusal,” in the Marxist sense of a proletarian revolution, are unten-
able (Foucault 1978: 96). Just as power operates at essentially local 
sites, so do “points of resistance” appear “everywhere in the power 
network” (p. 95). This notion of resistance further emphasizes the 
essentially local nature of power. Taking these characteristics to-
gether, we may note that the most important aspect of power is that 
it is fundamentally relational. As Foucault notes, “If we speak of the 
power of laws, institutions, and ideologies, if we speak of structures 
or mechanisms of power, it is only insofar as we suppose that certain 
persons exercise power over others The term ‘power’ designates 
relationships between ‘partners’” (Foucault 2000 [1994]a:337).
 For Foucault, the production and circulation of discourses 
are simultaneously mechanisms of social power. Corollary to 
this, he asserts that those who wish to exercise social power must 
use discourse in order to do so. The regulation of discourse deals 
with who is allowed to speak on a given topic, as well as which 
forms of knowledge are subjugated in the production of truth. As 
Foucault (2003) notes, “The delicate mechanisms of power cannot 
function unless knowledge, or rather knowledge apparatuses, are 
formed, organized, and put into circulation, and those apparatuses 
are not ideological trimmings or edifices” (pp. 33-34). Similarly, 
we should be attentive to the silences that lie outside the boundar-
ies of acceptable debate, for they are also part of the networks of 
power-knowledge that make up the discursive economy.
 Finally, if discourses are sites for the exercise of social power, 
then the production of discourse may also constrain and challenge 
the exercise of power. Emphasizing the inherent capacity for resis-
tance within power relations, Foucault writes, “The power relation-
ship and freedom’s refusal to submit cannot therefore be separated. 
. . . At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly 
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provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence 
of freedom” (Foucault 2000[1994]a: 342). Therefore, networks of 
power/knowledge are also sites of resistance, where all of the part-
ners within a power relationship produce and contest the truth.
 From Foucault, we see that discourse is an important object of 
social analysis, in and of itself. We also see that discourse operates 
in a more open, fluid and negotiated manner than models of ideol-
ogy suggest.  At the same time, critics of Foucault argue that he 
places too much emphasis on the discursive realm, while paying 
insufficient attention to the materiality of social actors who exist 
within economic relationships of social power (Hartsock 1990; 
Smith 1990; Smith 1999).
 Turning to the question of why the subjects of unequal power 
relations submit to their position, we may infer from Foucault that 
an acceptance of social inequality is part of the process whereby 
we take up discourse and incorporate it into our sense of self – our 
subjectivities. Discourses of truth reinforce larger-scale patterns of 
inequity as they are “taken for granted” and “consolidated” by a 
multiplicity of individuals inhabiting a range of social sites (such 
as the hospitals, psychiatric hospitals and prisons investigated by 
Foucault through his own research trajectory). 
Post-Marxism: Laclau and Mouffe
 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) offer a post-Marx-
ist model of discourse that builds upon the Marxist problematic of 
relations of oppression and domination within capitalism. Drawing 
on a Gramscian framework, they are concerned with the ways in 
which social power and resistance function through discourse. In 
their model, hegemony is achieved through the discursive connec-
tion of subject positions within the social realm. They adopt a more 
open, fluid conception of hegemony than Gramsci, arguing that 
there are only hegemonic moments within a complex and shifting 
discursive social reality. They write:
Hegemony is, quite simply, a political type of relation, a form, if 
one so wishes, of politics; but not a determinable location within 
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a topography of the social. In a given social formation, there can 
be a variety of hegemonic nodal points . . . they may constitute 
points of condensation of a number of social relations . . . inso-
far as the social is an infinitude not reducible to any underlying 
unitary principle, the mere idea of a centre of the social has no 
meaning at all (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:139).
 Laclau and Mouffe focus on deconstructing the essentialist 
elements of critical theories of ideology. For example, they reject 
the notion of class as a foundational category of political identity. 
They argue that a sense of political identity does not emerge from 
one’s class position. Rather, individuals work to construct a col-
lective political identity through discourses that create relations of 
“equivalence” between subject positions (p. 128). There is no pre-
ordained reason why the working class should adopt a left politics. 
Discourses of equivalence may construct a working class identity, 
which links working class subject positions in opposition to a dis-
cursively constructed capitalist class. However, the construction 
of such a subject position requires concerted effort. Alternatively, 
working class identity might be constructed in alliance with the na-
tion state in opposition to an external other through a discourse of 
national security (as was witnessed in the aftermath of 9/11 in the 
United States). Furthermore, they highlight the ways in which we 
can construct political subjectivity in a multiplicity of ways other 
than around economic class. In recent decades, the “new social 
movements” based on gender, ethnicity, sexuality, or environmental 
degradation, have illustrated that class is not the only channel of 
social power, nor is it the only foundation upon which resistance 
to power may be based (p. 159).
 The authors also reject the Marxist model of class struggle, 
where the working class faces off against the capitalist class in 
an all-or-nothing, epochal struggle, like Godzilla battling Mothra 
over the fate of Tokyo. As an alternative to the Marxist framework, 
Laclau and Mouffe offer a pluralist form of political action, where 
people actively build “chains of equivalence” among different 
subject positions (p. 170). The creation of counter-hegemonic 
blocs among subject positions is an active, discursive process. They 
term this a politics of “radical democracy,” where hegemony and 
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counter-hegemony are worked out in everyday struggles among a 
multiplicity of political actors (p. 176). Echoing Gramsci, ideologi-
cal power does not work as a monolithic system that subjugates the 
masses in the interests of the capitalist class. Hegemony is always 
contested; we may only speak of the relative success of a particular 
hegemonic discourse.
 While Laclau and Mouffe work from a Gramscian point of de-
parture, their work has broad resonances with Foucault. The authors 
contribute to a theory of discourse by focusing on the relationship 
between discourse, subjectivity and hegemony. As in the work of 
Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe suggest that an acceptance of social 
inequality is produced as we incorporate hegemonic discourses 
into our individual subjectivities. Discourse works on individual 
social actors while producing hegemonic effects across a multiplic-
ity of social locations. The authors also point to the multiplicity 
of subject positions, networks of power, and points of resistance 
beyond the confines of economic class. Laclau and Mouffe also 
collapse the Marxist distinction between economic base and cultural 
superstructure by absorbing everything into discourse. However, 
their conception of discourse may seem so broad that it embraces 
everything in the social world, leaving nothing outside discourse. 
Gender, Ideology and Discourse
 Up to this point, I have traced line across the ideology-dis-
course continuum. I began with Marx’s notion of ideology, moved 
through the Gramscian model of hegemony, and concluded with 
a description of the discourse theories of post-structuralism and 
post-Marxism. I described a movement from a model of ideologi-
cal closure and domination by one class over its subordinates, to a 
model of a near-infinite multiplicity of discourses, political subject 
positions and relations of power. In the remainder of the paper, I 
examine theories of gender and of “race,” as they relate to questions 
of ideology and discourse. In general, these theories occupy a range 
of positions on the ideology-discourse continuum. If we imagine 
a mid-point to this continuum, some of these theories occupy the 
critical side of this point, while others occupy the post-structural-
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ist side of this point. However, most of the key theorists described 
here share an interest in exploring the thorny terrain at the centre 
of the continuum. Furthermore, this body of work has a common 
interest in decentering the privileged position of economic class.
On the Critical side of the Ideology/Discourse Continuum
 Dorothy Smith (1990; 1999) conceives of ideology as a mode 
of reasoning, or creating knowledge, that abstracts from lived in-
dividuals engaged in everyday/everynight social interaction. For 
example, disciplines like Economics, or Sociology may construct 
“ideological circles” that form textual realities that are abstracted 
from the lived, material reality of the work people do to produce and 
reproduce social life (Smith 1990:172). These abstracted systems of 
knowledge, which transform human actors into statistics, are part 
of an apparatus Smith terms the “relations of ruling” that convince 
us to participate in social systems of oppression and inequality (p. 
14). The relations of ruling refers to the ways in which social power 
works through written texts, such as the rules that govern behaviour 
in work settings, or the laws that are used to police deviant groups. 
Smith terms those discourses that are reproduced through texts and 
work towards ideological closure “T-discourses” (Smith 1999:158). 
These T-discourses form a dense system that gives voice to the rela-
tions of ruling. Ideological T-discourses define the limits of social 
action and legitimate relations of power. Through the circulation 
of T-discourses, the relations of ruling found in institutions such 
as schools and corporations, or in the “Standard North American 
Family” are reproduced (Smith 1999).
 Smith’s (1999) writing repeatedly returns to the theme of a 
revised Marxist materialism, which favors the everyday material 
activity of individuals as a site for producing knowledge. She posits 
a “standpoint of women” as a privileged position from which to 
challenge the relations of ruling (p. 74). For Smith, women collec-
tively occupy a position of subalternity in contemporary societies, 
which are marked by gendered (as well as class-based) structures of 
social power. From the material foundation of everyday/everynight 
action, women’s standpoint is equipped to deconstruct the truth 
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claims of the relations of ruling, thereby opening up new spaces for 
political action and resistance. In engaging with textual discourses, 
Smith describes the need for a forceful re-entry of the social into 
textual analysis. She writes:
Post-structuralist/postmodernist theorizing of discourse . . . 
captures the displacement of locally situated subjects precisely 
in its insistence on the absence of subjects from the determina-
tion of meaning and on the self-preferentiality of language and 
discourse in this new mode. Yet it leaves unanalysed the socially 
organized practices and relations that objectify, even those vis-
ible in discourse itself. . . . Taking women’s standpoint, we 
remember that we, the actual readers/writers/speakers/hearers, 
who disappear in the relations of intertextuality, are also those 
who participate, generate, provide the dynamic of the ruling 
relations (Smith 1999:80).
That is, we should recognize that discourse is a product of social 
interaction, not only an abstract entity that floats above individual 
social actors.
 Smith brings a necessary focus to the role of living individuals 
(including social theorists) as active participants in discourse. She 
is interested in post-structuralism’s deconstruction of authoritative 
discourses and its destabilization of truth claims. At the same time, 
she is highly critical of post-structuralism’s overly discursive con-
ception of the social. Smith’s particular model of ideology is also 
useful. Here, ideology is a system of discourses that constitutes a 
macro-social set of ruling relations. However, this is produced and 
reproduced through the micro-social interactions of individuals 
across a range of social locations.
 Smith’s notion of the standpoint of women attempts to bridge 
the post-structuralist destabilization of a universal subject and 
Marxist realist materialism. She seeks a standpoint epistemology 
that can destabilize the ideological truth regimes of the relations 
of ruling, while also producing its own counter-hegemonic truth 
claims. However, the notion of the standpoint of women risks an 
essentialized view of gender. While Smith notes the diversity of 
women’s experience, women’s standpoint often seems synonymous 
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with a standpoint of mothers, wives and caretakers, whose relation 
to reproductive labor is their defining characteristic. Similarly, 
Smith describes a male social science that is inherently abstract 
from social reality, while women’s standpoint is rooted in processes 
of social reproduction. This does risk reproducing a Cartesian di-
chotomy where men occupy an abstract, intellectual social space, 
while women occupy a material, bodily realm. Here, Smith risks 
valorizing the latter in place of the former.
On the Post . . . Side of the Ideology/Discourse Continuum
 Smith generally inhabits the critical theory side of the ideol-
ogy-discourse continuum, while also engaging with the insights of 
post-structuralism. However, feminist engagements with issues of 
discourse, ideology and social power also occur on the post-structur-
alist side of the continuum. For example, Donna Haraway inhabits 
a tension between critical theories of ideology and post-structural 
theories of discourse, while arguing against a class-centered notion 
of social power and political agency.
 Haraway’s (1991) “Cyborg Manifesto,” which alludes to Marx’s 
Communist Manifesto, poses a challenge to narratives of economic 
class that have been central to critical theories of power, politics 
and resistance. In this essay and elsewhere, Haraway (1991; 2004 
[1992]) focuses on the many ways in which the social world can 
no longer be understood according to a binary logic of class (ruling 
class vs. working class), or of gender (men vs. women). Rather, if 
we experience the world through the lens of class or gender, it is 
because we pick up dominant discourses of gender and class, make 
them our own, and express them through our social relations with 
others. As Haraway (1997) writes:
Gender is always a relationship, not a preformed category of be-
ings or a possession that one can have. Gender does not pertain 
more to women than to men. Gender is the relation between 
variously constituted categories of men and women . . . differ-
entiated by nation, generation, class, lineage, color, and much 
else (p. 28).
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 Haraway characterizes the “amodern” social world by the 
growing permeability of boundaries between humans and animals, 
society and nature, and the organic and the technological (Haraway 
2004 [1992]:77). The result is that the amodern subject position 
is always a “cyborg” subject position. The cyborg is a recurring, 
often monstrous, figure of science fiction that is part human and 
part machine (Haraway 1991:148). For Haraway, it is a suitable 
metaphor for our current experience of subjectivity. We are no 
longer simply members of a class, a gender, a nation, or an ethnic 
group. Rather, we are hybrid beings, composed of multiple identity 
positions that overlap and intersect. She writes, “So my cyborg myth 
is about transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous 
possibilities which progressive people might explore as one part 
of needed political work” (p. 154). Her use of an often monstrous 
trope suggests that a cyborg politics must also engage with that 
which appears alien and hostile upon first glance; it challenges us 
to overcome a binary politics of “good versus evil.”
 Related to this is Haraway’s notion of the “informatics of 
domination” (p. 161; also see Gane and Haraway 2006). This is her 
expression of a rather Foucaultian conception of power, wherein 
social power is not a top-down flow from elites to masses, or an 
objective thing, but a property of social relations.  Like Foucault, 
Haraway sees power operating in a dense network throughout 
the everyday social world. Here, the creation and reproduction of 
gendered, racialized and class based systems of power continue to 
have relevance, but Haraway wants us to rethink the ways in which 
these systems of power are intertwined and joined by other power 
relations built around sexuality, nationality, species, and so on.
 Also echoing Foucault, the exercise of power always implies 
the possibility of resistance. While the informatics of domination 
permeates all social relations, these relations “aren’t all powerful, 
they’re interrupted in a million ways … one minute they look like 
they control the entire planet, the next minute they look like a 
house of cards” (Gane and Haraway 2006:151). Echoing Laclau 
and Mouffe’s notion of radical democracy, if there is a collective 
political actor it is not Marx’s working class. Rather, it is a cyborg 
entity, made up of a multiplicity of partially connected actors. 
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Discourses of gender, class, “race” and sexuality are the tissues 
that potentially bring together members of this cyborg political 
subject. What is unique about Haraway’s vision and distinguishes 
her from both other feminist and post-structuralist theorists, is that 
both the cyborg figure and the informatics of domination do not 
consist only of human actors. Haraway’s theory of power, domina-
tion and political subjectivity expands to include humans, animals, 
machines, myths and science fictions in its collection of parts.
 Haraway takes up post-structuralist and post-Marxist themes 
in her deconstruction of the grand narratives of class domination 
and revolution that characterize critical theories of ideology. A 
post-structuralist influence is also evident in her uneasiness with a 
universal female subject within feminist theory and her desire to 
view gender as a social process, rather than a preformed essence.
 However, Haraway is distinct from other post-structuralist influ-
enced writers in her insistence on the materiality of a social world 
that becomes intelligible through discourse. She is perhaps not as 
materialist in orientation as Smith is, but neither does she inhabit 
a theoretical world of pure simulation and textuality. Furthermore, 
both Haraway and Smith display a willingness to navigate the messy 
terrain between critical theories of ideology, and post-structuralist 
and post-Marxist theories of discourse.
 From this perspective, it appears that individual and collec-
tive social actors consent to participate in systems of gendered 
and class-based social inequality through their engagement with 
a multitude of discourses about gender, class, “race,” sexuality, or 
nature. These discourses circulate throughout everyday life: in the 
media, schools, or the family. This approach to the question of our 
participation in systems of domination and inequality pays attention 
to the insights of both critical theory and post-structuralism.
‘Race’ and Ethnicity, Ideology and Discourse
 Critical theories of “race” and ethnicity also point to a lacuna 
in critical theories of ideology. Whereas gender theory refocuses 
our attention on the way that ideological discourse may reproduce 
relations of inequality between men and women, critical “race” 
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theories bring racialized networks of power into view. Here, we 
see how the consent of subjects of inequitable relations of power 
is secured through discourses of racialization, which circulate at 
both micro-social and macro-social levels. 
On the Critical Side of the Ideology/Discourse Continuum
 Franz Fanon (2004 [1963]) takes up many of the same themes 
found in Gramsci’s work. In his analysis of colonialism, Fanon 
focuses on issues of hegemony, the role of Third World intellectuals 
in providing direction to revolutionary moments, and the difficulty 
of applying Marxist theoretical schemes to class politics in the 
colonized world. One of Fanon’s (2004 [1963]) central claims is 
that colonialism constructs a “compartmentalized world” of colonist 
and colonized, where “race” is just as significant a social force as 
class (p. 5). Within this compartmentalized world, the colonized are 
subject to a hegemony that is material/economic as well as cultural 
and psychological. Fanon (2004 [1963]) writes:
Looking at the immediacies of the colonial context, it is clear that 
what divides this world is first and foremost what species, what 
race one belongs to. In the colonies the economic infrastructure 
is also a superstructure. The cause is effect: You are rich because 
you are white, you are white because you are rich (p. 5).
Colonized peoples see themselves through the eyes of the colonizer, 
as the marginalized other to a valorized European culture. Thus, 
colonialism functions through economic and political domination, 
as well as through cultural hegemony.
 According to Fanon (and foreshadowing Marcuse), the mem-
bers of colonized societies who are admitted to the bourgeoisie 
and the working class are too easily swayed by the concessions of 
colonialism to effectively form a collective political actor. Fanon 
writes, “In the capitalist countries, the proletariat has nothing to 
lose and possibly everything to gain. In the colonized countries, the 
proletariat has everything to lose. It represents in fact that fraction 
of the colonized who are indispensable for running the colonial 
machine” (p. 64). Instead, the lumpenproletariat of Third World 
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villages — the most marginalized members of colonial society--be-
comes the most promising historical class actor. With the guidance 
of subaltern intellectuals, the subaltern classes can launch a dual 
revolution of violence and cultural rejuvenation against the coloniz-
ing class. For Fanon, violence is both a psychological and social 
necessity. Violence is the only tool that is capable of driving out 
the colonizer. At the same time, violence works as a form of social 
therapy, a physical act of rejection of colonial cultural hegemony.
 Fanon’s main strength is a radical re-reading of Marx, which 
illuminates how ideologies of racialization work within a distinct 
form of the capitalist mode of production. For example, he illus-
trates how the interests of colonized members of the proletariat 
and bourgeoisie are articulated to the colonial social order. At 
the same time, Fanon’s adherence to Marxist class categories is a 
limitation, even where a racialized lumpenproletariat displaces the 
(White) proletariat as a historical class actor. Fanon’s valorization 
of violence as a force for social change is also questionable, when 
one considers the failure of violent revolution to create equitable 
and just socialist societies in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, as 
Parry (2004) argues, Fanon is worth drawing upon for his insistence 
that anti-colonial politics cannot be limited to the realm of culture. 
Rather, resistance to racialized networks of power requires a praxis 
that combines the deconstruction of hegemony with concrete politi-
cal action.
 Similarly, Stuart Hall draws upon Gramscian theory as a tool 
for bridging cultural analysis and the economic analysis of tradi-
tional Marxist theory. In “Race, Articulation, and Societies Struc-
tured in Dominance,” Hall (1980; also see Hall, 1996a) explores 
the relevance of Gramsci for critical “race” theory. His argument 
is dialectical in form. First, he describes a Marxist approach to 
“race,” wherein racism is rooted in economic structure. Here, racial 
inequality is a cultural reflection of the economic base of society. 
Racializing ideologies work to justify a system of economic inequal-
ity that is beneficial for capital, in terms of providing a supply of 
cheap, disposable labor.
 This position is contrasted with its opposite, a cultural theory 
of “race,” in which “race” is seen as important in itself for struc-
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turing social relations. Here, racialized networks of power appear 
to have no reference to the political economy of capitalism. From 
here, Hall invokes Gramsci to synthesize the opposing positions. 
For him, the Gramscian position illuminates how racist ideologies 
and social practices are articulated to systems of economic strati-
fication in distinct ways in specific historical and social locations. 
He writes:
One must start, then, from the concrete historical ‘work’ which 
racism accomplishes under specific historical conditions — as a 
set of economic, political and ideological practices . . . Though 
the economic aspects are critical, as a way of beginning, this form 
of hegemony cannot be understood as operating purely through 
economic coercion (Hall 1980:338).
We cannot assume the specific forms of articulation between racial-
izing discourse and material inequality a priori, but must attend to 
how people work to create and resist these articulations in specific 
social settings.
 While Hall is useful for conceptualizing the interconnections 
between class and “race” in the cultural and economic spheres, 
there is a sense here that class is a more objective form of social 
identity than “race.” That is, Hall seems to suggest a Marxist no-
tion of classes as a priori historical actors, while “races” appear as 
ideological social constructions.
On the Post . . . Side of the Ideology/Discourse Continuu
 The work of Edward Said provides a point of entry into a more 
cultural approach to questions of discourse, racialization and power. 
In Orientatlism, Said (1979) draws on Foucauldian notions of dis-
course and power/knowledge to produce a genealogy of “Oriental-
ism” as an academic discipline (p. 6). Orientalism refers to systems 
of constructing knowledge about--and producing —“the Orient” as 
a discursive object of colonialism and governance (p. 177). While 
Said is careful to note that we should understand the power-effects 
produced by Orientalist discourse as working in conjunction with 
the political institutions of colonialism, the bulk of his analysis 
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provides deep readings of Orientalist texts. Echoing Fanon, Said 
notes that Orientalist discourse produces an essentially divided so-
cial reality, split between the Occidental self and the Oriental other. 
Hegemonic discourses of Orientalism work to legitimate Western 
cultural, political and economic dominance over the Middle East 
and North Africa. 
 Said’s work is useful for illuminating how cultural discourses 
construct an Orient that can be subjected to Western political and 
economic domination. Said echoes Fanon in his description of a fun-
damentally divided world. However, Said departs from Fanon in his 
analytical emphasis on the cultural realm as the place where social 
power is expressed. Unlike Fanon, he backgrounds an analysis of 
economic structures and state coercion as primary forms of social 
control, though he does allude to their importance as “stabilizing 
influences” in the process of colonization (p. 201). 
 However, Ahmad (1992) argues that Said’s notion of an Ori-
entalist discourse that spans ancient Greek writing to the present 
is fundamentally un-Foucauldian in its totalizing, ahistorical form. 
Said is also criticized for not including other voices of resistance, for 
not giving voice to the patterned silences in Orientalist discourse. 
The only deconstructive voice is Said’s. He does not account for the 
ways in which subjects of this dominant discourse have received, 
negotiated, or rejected it. We could extend this critique to a signifi-
cant portion of discourse theory.
 In Yearning, bell hooks (1990) explores the intersections of 
“race,” class and gender in social inequality and counter-hegemonic 
politics. Through a series of essays, she provides a wide-rang-
ing discussion of postmodernity, the discursive representation of 
Black identity, and strategies for resistance to racialized systems 
of power. Like Said, she also engages in a critical reading of cul-
tural texts, though she is primarily interested in the production of 
Blackness and gender in books and film. For hooks, the vision of 
difference embodied in post-structuralism, which undermines the 
notion of a unitary historical class actor, is problematic when it 
displaces notions of “oppression, exploitation, and domination” 
from its analysis (hooks 1990:51-52, emphasis in original). For 
her, we should not lose sight of racialized and gendered structures 
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of privilege and oppression, which are both material and cultural. 
Thus, a counter-hegemonic politics that takes up the challenge of 
post-structuralism requires constructing linkages across multiple 
sites of subalternity.
 For hooks (1990), the notion of “yearning” provides a founda-
tion for a counter-hegemonic political standpoint that incorporates 
“race,” gender and class as dimensions of social power (p. 27). 
She describes yearning as “a common psychological state shared 
by many of us . . . Specifically, in relation to the post-modernist 
deconstruction of ‘master’ narratives, the yearning that wells in 
the hearts and minds of those whom such narratives have silenced 
is the longing for critical voice” (p. 27). hooks sees “marginality” 
as an important location for the production of knowledge and for 
engaging in political resistance to power (p. 149). She writes:
Understanding marginality as position and place of resistance 
is crucial for oppressed, exploited, colonized people. If we only 
view the margin as sign marking the despair, a deep nihilism pen-
etrates in a destructive way the very ground of our being. . . . I am 
not trying to romantically re-inscribe the notion of that space of 
marginality where the oppressed live apart from their oppressors 
as ‘pure.’ I want to say that these margins have been both sites of 
repression and sites of resistance” (hooks 1990:150-151).
Similar to Smith’s standpoint of women, hooks advocates a politics 
that is grounded in the experience of marginality and subalternity. 
This experiential position facilitates the construction of a counter-
hegemonic knowledge that can undermine the master narratives 
of class, “race,” and gender without abdicating the ability to make 
truth claims.
 Like Smith and Haraway, theorists like Hall and hooks attempt 
to navigate the tensions between critical theories of ideology and 
the post-structuralist and post-Marxist focus on discourse. This 
work moves us beyond a model of class as the sole foundation of 
ideological power and political resistance. It also adopts a broader 
conception of social power than posited by Marxist theory. How-
ever, these theorists avoid a conception of power that is so dif-
fused that it becomes meaningless to talk about class, gender and 
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racialization as structures of power that inform social interaction 
at the everyday level. Here, consent to systems of domination is 
produced as people adopt the discourses of class, “race” and gender 
that circulate throughout the media, the state and the education sys-
tem. These discourses make our ongoing participation in existing 
systems of political and economic inequality seem more feasible 
than political action directed at radical social change. 
Conclusion
 Through this theoretical overview, I have traced a route through 
a map of theories of ideology, hegemony and discourse (recall Fig-
ure 1). These key theorists provide a variety of explanations for the 
ways in which ideology and discourse function to convince people 
to accept systems of social inequality as acceptable and immune 
from social transformation. In explaining why people consent to 
unequal relations of social power, they also illuminate possibilities 
for resistance to ideological power and for social change.
 In the first part of this paper, I described the movement from 
Marxist theories of ideology, through Gramscian hegemony theory 
post-structuralist and post-Marxist theories of discourse. This path 
takes us from theories of ideological power as relatively closed, 
unidirectional and monolithic to a model of discursive power as 
open, contested and microsocial. Second, I examined bodies of 
theory that deny economic class its status as the foundational site of 
ideological power and political resistance. Through critical theories 
of “race” and gender, we see how ideological discourse works to 
construct racialized and gendered networks of power.
 The first part of this paper follows in the tradition of earlier 
reviews of Marxism, critical theory and post-structuralism (Agger 
1998; Best and Kellner 1991; Eagleton 1991). In contrast to these 
reviews, I have focused specifically on how these bodies of theory 
approach the problematic of the relationship between the production 
of social knowledge and the reproduction of inequitable systems 
of social power. At the same time, I have attempted to broaden the 
scope of theoretical dialogue to include critical theories of gender 
and “race” as important contributions to our understanding of how 
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culture and knowledge are mobilized to reproduce social privilege 
and inequality. As such, this paper differs from earlier reviews by 
going beyond calls for a rapprochement between critical theory and 
post-structuralism.
 Table 1 (see pages 220-221) summarizes the key bodies of 
theory reviewed here and compares them along three dimensions: the 
institutional sites of ideological power, the character of ideological 
power, and the vision offered for resistance to ideological power. 
Here, we see how each of these theoretical approaches envisions 
the social institutions that produce consent to power, the nature of 
consent to power, and the possible limitations to consent. Marxist 
and critical models focus on how cultural production inculcates 
consent among the working classes in a largely unidirectional way. 
By contrast, post-structuralism focuses on how ideological power is 
neither unidirectional nor homogenous. Instead, consent and resis-
tance are produced through a multitude of discourses that circulate 
throughout the social, without the direction of particular elites.
 However, the ongoing work of theorists of gender and 
“race”— Hall, Smith, hooks and Haraway — offers a more complex 
understanding of how our consent to power is produced within con-
temporary capitalist societies. There are three reasons that I make this 
claim. First, though there are important distinctions between these 
theorists, all of them attempt to inhabit the muddled terrain between 
the extreme poles of ideology theory and discourse theory. These 
authors eschew the notion that social relationships in the economic 
base determine the content of the cultural superstructure. However, 
there is also typically an aversion to a conception of the social as en-
tirely discursive. Second, while these theories engage with Foucault’s 
emphasis on the microsocial dimensions of discursive power, they 
do not let go of the notion that there are persistent patterns of macro-
social power. Third, these theorists also pick up post-structuralism’s 
destabilization of class as the main force for structuring social power. 
However, they avoid a conception of political subjectivity that is so 
open as to make collective political action difficult to envision.
 Through this work, we see how consent to multiple intersect-
ing networks of power occurs because we adopt the discourses that 
circulate throughout civil society (the media, schools, family). As 
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we take up ideological discourses, we become gendered and racial-
ized subjects. Through the everyday mundane nature of ideology, 
we come to accept inequities of class, gender, and ethnicity as 
immune to radical transformation. However, ideological closure 
is never completely achieved. As people actively forge political 
connections among different subject positions, they illuminate the 
limits of consent and disrupt it. Of the key theorists reviewed here, 
it is the work of Hall, Smith, hooks and Haraway that present the 
most useful directions for moving forward as we continue to think 
about the relationships between culture and economy, knowledge 
and power, and domination and resistance.
 If this model of power, domination, and consent is correct, there 
are also important implications for theory and political practice. 
In this model, power is discursive, while having material effects. 
It flows throughout daily life in multiple directions. As such, it 
is untenable to envision a Marxist style of revolution, which can 
ultimately overcome power. Instead, we are better off directing 
theory and practice at destabilizing our consent to these power 
relations. Social theory might help produce the kind of reflexivity 
that encourages us to better monitor and manage relations of power. 
This leaves us with the prospect of an endless project of challeng-
ing and minimizing the harmful effects of power relations, through 
practices like radical democracy or cyborg politics.
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